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好きに and Making Amazon.com: Breaking and Cabinets Governments: 洋書
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商品詳細情報
| 管理番号 | 中古 ：9310719678 | 発売日 | 2024/06/01 | 定価 | 12500円 | 型番 | 9310719678 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| カテゴリ | |||||||||
好きに and Making Amazon.com: Breaking and Cabinets Governments: 洋書
Amazon.com: Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and。Amazon.com: Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and。Amazon.com: Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and。Social Credit: The Warring States of China's Emerging Data。
Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and derive equilibria. They also derive a number of empirical hypotheses about outcomes of this game, which they then test with data drawn from most of the postwar European parliamentary democracies. The book concludes with a number of observations about departmentalistic tendencies and centripetal forces in parliamentary regimes.
Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and derive equilibria. They also derive a number of empirical hypotheses about outcomes of this game, which they then test with data drawn from most of the postwar European parliamentary democracies. The book concludes with a number of observations about departmentalistic tendencies and centripetal forces in parliamentary regimes.
| カテゴリー: | 本・雑誌・漫画>>>本>>>洋書 |
|---|---|
| 商品の状態: | 未使用に近い |
| 配送料の負担: | 送料込み(出品者負担) |
| 配送の方法: | 佐川急便/日本郵便 |
| 発送元の地域: | 千葉県 |
| 発送までの日数: | 2~3日で発送 |
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